Why Lawyers are Nice (or Nasty): A Game-Theoretical Argumentation Exercise
LINK to article on SSRN
ABSTRACT:
This contribution introduces a novel approach to study legal interactions, legal professions, and legal institutions, by combining argumentation, game theory and evolution. We consider a population of lawyers, having different postures, who engage in adversarial argumentation with other lawyers, obtaining outcomes according to the existing context and their chosen strategies. We examine the resulting games and analyse the evolution of the population.
European University Institute Working Paper Series
This new framework has enabled us to show that given certain hypotheses concerning the costs of proceeding, the most successful posture for a lawyer is to be non-honest and nonaggressive, followed by being honest and aggressive, then by being honest and non-aggressive, and finally by being non-honest and aggressive. In other words, given that framework, being non-honest pays only when one is non-aggressive, while aggressiveness only pays when coupled with honesty. We have also shown that by changing the external variable (in particular by reducing the costs of adversarial contest), dishonesty may lose its edge. Our dynamical analysis, while being still very preliminary, also leads to interesting results, such as the emergence (given a certain cost structure) of an environment where non-honest lawyers tend to prevail, followed by non-honest and aggressive ones, while the frequency of the honest and non-aggressive tends to decrease. More important, we the ideas presented in the present paper pave the way for future developments where AI and law can be combined not only with argumentation theory but also with legal sociology and (behavioural) economics.